In this note, I explain how a variant of David Miller's (1975) argument concerning the language-dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's (1998) notion of the accuracy of "estimates of numerical truth-values" (viz., Joycean credences). This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences (understood as "estimates of numerical truth-values" in Joyce's sense) should obey the probability calculus.
Miller on the Language Dependence of Predictive Accuracy
Suppose we have two numerical quantities φ and ψ. These might be, for instance, the velocities (in some common units) of two objects, at some time (or some other suitable physical quantity of two objects at a time). Suppose further that we have two sets of predictions concerning the values of φ and ψ, which are entailed by two hypotheses H 1 H 2 0.100 1.000 0.800 1.700 T 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 Table 1 : Canonical example of the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions It seems clear that the predictions of H 2 are "closer to the truth T about φ and ψ" than the predictions of H 1 are. After all, the predicted values entailed by H 2 are strictly in between the values predicted by H 1 and the true values entailed by T . However, as Popper (1972, Appendix 2) showed [using a recipe invented by David Miller (1975) ], there exist quantities α and β (as in the table) satisfying both of the following conditions:
1. α and β are symmetrically inter-definable with respect to φ and ψ in the following (linear) way:
2. The values for α and β entailed by H 2 are strictly "farther from the truth T about α and β" than the values for α and β entailed by H 1 .
As Miller (1975) explains [see (Miller, 2006 
That is, for many cases in which we judge that "H 2 is closer to the truth T about φ and ψ than H 1 is" (on many ways of comparing "closeness") there will exist some member of the above family of symmetric inter-translations such that we will judge that "H 1 is closer to the truth T about α and β than H 2 is". In this way, we can often reverse accuracy comparisons of quantitative theories via such re-descriptions of prediction problems. As such, many assessments of the accuracy of predictions are language dependent. 1 2 Joyce on Probabilism and the "Accuracy" of Credences
According to Joyce (1998) , if we view credences (of rational agents) as numerical estimates of truth-values of propositions, then we can give an argument for probabilism that is based on considerations having to do with the "accuracy" of such estimates. I won't get into all the details of Joyce's various arguments here. Rather, I will focus on a simple, concrete example that illustrates a (potential) problem of language dependence. Consider an agent S facing a very simple situation, involving only one atomic sentence P . Suppose that S is logically omniscient (i.e., S assigns the same credences to logically equivalent statements, and he also assigns zero credence to all contradictions and credence one to all tautologies in his toy language). Thus, all that matters concerning S's coherence (in Joyce's sense) is whether S's credences b in P and ¬P sum to one (and are non-negative). Now, following Joyce, we will associate the truth-value True with the number 1 and the truthvalue False with the number 0. Let φ be the numerical value associated with P 's truth-value, and let ψ be the numerical value associated with ¬P 's truth-value (of course, φ and ψ will vary in the obvious ways across the two salient possible worlds: w 1 , in which P is false, and w 2 , in which P is true). We can now state (informally) the sort of Theorem(s) that Joyce has been writing about for a number of years.
Theorem (Joyce) . If S's credence function b -construed as providing estimates of φ and ψ -fails to be probabilistic, then there exists a probabilistic b that is more accurate than b (according to a suitable "scoring rule") regarding φ and ψ -in all possible worlds. And, no coherent (probabilistic) credence function is accuracy-dominated in this sense by any incoherent credence function (a key asymmetry).
Joyce makes various assumptions about how to measure "the accuracy of estimates of φ and ψ -in a possible world". The various choices of "scoring rule" that one might make in order to render such "accuracy measurements" will not be important for the issue that I am going to raise here. The phenomenon will arise for any such instantiation of Joyce's framework. Rather than describing my "reversal theorem" in such general terms, I will illustrate it via a very simple concrete example, regarding our toy agent S, and assuming the Brier Score as our "accuracy measure". Suppose that S's credence function (b) assigns the following values P and ¬P (i.e., b entails the following numerical "estimates" of the quantities φ and ψ). Table 3 : An example of the language-dependence of Joycean Brier-domination The estimates entailed by b are more accurate -with respect to φ and ψ -in both w 1 and w 2 , according to the Brier Score. A natural question to ask (in light of section 1, above) is whether there is a Miller-style symmetric inter-translation that can reverse this Brierdominance relation. Interestingly, it can be shown (proof omitted) that there is no linear Miller-style symmetric inter-translation (of the simple form above) that will do the trick. But, there is a slightly more complex (non-linear) symmetric inter-translation that will yield the desired reversal (and it is depicted above). Furthermore, it can be shown that this very same numerical inter-translation will yield such a reversal for any coherent function b that Brier-dominates b for this incoherent agent S (with respect to φ and ψ). To be more precise, we have the following theorem about our (particular) agent S:
Theorem. For any coherent function b that Brier-dominates S's credence function b with respect to φ and ψ, there exist quantities α and β that are symmetrically inter-definable with respect to φ and ψ, via the following specific symmetric intertranslations. Where b Brier-dominates b with respect to α and β. It is also noteworthy that the true values of α and β "behave like truth-values", in the sense that (a) the true value of α (β) in w 1 (w 2 ) is identical to the true value of β (α) in w 2 (w 1 ), and (b) the true values of α and β always sum to one. Indeed, these transformations are guaranteed to preserve coherence of all dominating b 's, and the "truth-vectors". , where c is in the units of φ and ψ, and c takes the value 1. So amended, our translations would be appropriate for quantities with an associated physical dimension (e.g., velocities). But, because we're dealing with dimensionless quantities here (e.g., probabilities), dimensional homogeneity is not even a pressing issue for us. See (Szirtes, 2007, Chapter 6 ) for a useful discussion concerning dimensional homogeneity. 3 A Mathematica notebook that contains verifications of all of the technical claims made in this note is available from the author. The notebook can be downloaded from the following URL: http://fitelson.org/joyce.nb. More general results can be proven (and further constraints can be accommodated on the desired translation scheme). But, all I need (dialectically) is one incoherent agent S for which I can ensure reversals of all such Brier-dominance relations via a single, symmetric intertranslation to/from the φ/ψ representation and the α/β representation. See the last section for further discussion.
will be that Joyce needs to tell us more about (precisely) what he means when he says that "credences are (numerical) estimates of (numerical) truth-values". Specifically, I think the present phenomenon challenges us to get clearer on the precise content of the accuracy norm(s) that are applicable to (or constitutive of) the Joycean cognitive act of "estimation of the (numerical) truth-value of a proposition".
3 Some Possible Reactions
Naturalness/Privileged Language
One might try to maintain that (in some sense) the quantities φ and ψ are "more natural" (in this context) than α and β and/or that the "estimation problem" involving φ and ψ is somehow "privileged" (in comparison to the α/β "estimation problem"). I don't really see how such an argument would go. First, from the point of view of the α/β-language, the quantities φ and ψ seem just as "gerrymandered" as the quantities α and β might appear from the point of view of Joyce's preferred numerical representation of the truth-values. Moreover, there is a disanalogy to the case of physical magnitudes like velocity, since truthvalues don't seem to have numerical properties (per se). That is, there is already something a little artificial about thinking of truth-values as the sort of things that can be "numerically estimated" (where the "estimates" are numerically scored for "accuracy").
"Asymmetries" in Accuracy-Dominance in the α/β-Language
One might try to find some (new) accuracy-dominance asymmetry between coherent and incoherent credences in the α/β-language. I see two problems with this strategy. First, in the α/β-language (as opposed to the φ/ψ-language), some coherent vectors (in Joyce's sense) are Brier-dominated by an incoherent vector (witness the example above). Having said that, it is also true that there do exist other coherent credence functions b that Brier-dominate b with respect to α and β. As such, we don't have an "utter reversal" of the (full) asymmetry between coherent and incoherent vectors in the φ/ψ-language. I'm not sure that's required here (for our purposes). We have certainly broken the (full) asymmetry between coherent and incoherent vectors. Moreover, we could define-up another pair of quantities γ and η (symmetrically inter-definable with respect to α and β -perhaps relative to a new family of inter-translations) which reverses these new (b vs b) relations of Brier-dominance, and so on. . . . So, this response just seems to re-iterate the initial problem.
3.3
Disanalogies between "Estimation" and "Prediction" I think the most promising (and useful) response to the phenomenon is to argue (i) that there are crucial disanalogies between "estimation" (in Joyce's sense) and "prediction" (in the sense presupposed by Popper and Miller) , and (ii) these disanalogies imply that my "reversal argument" is presupposing something incorrect regarding the norms appropriate to "estimation".
Here, it is important to note that Joyce does not tell us very much about what he means by "estimation". He does say a few things that are suggestive about what "estimation" is not. Specifically, Joyce clearly thinks: of S's guesses about α, β (at least, to the extent that I understand the "norms of guessing"). Similarly, if E involves expectation, then ( †) will demonstrably fail (in general) for non-linear functions like our f . [Although, on an expectation reading of "estimate," ( †) will demonstrably hold for all linear inter-translations.] Unfortunately for Joyce, neither of these interpretations of E is available to him. So, this yields no concrete reasons to reject ( †) in our example.
On the other hand, if E involved assertion (as in item 3 above), then ( †) would be eminently plausible. On an assertion reading of E, ( †) is tantamount to a simple form of deductive closure for assertoric commitments (in the traditional sense). And, this would be very similar to the way Popper and Miller were thinking about the predictions of (deterministic, quantitative) scientific theories. 4 It seems clear that E is not exactly like that (in this context), but this (alone) doesn't give us any concrete reasons to reject ( †) in this case.
I submit that what we need here is a (sufficiently precise) theory of E, which satisfies Joyce's explicit commitments (1)- (3) above, and which is also precise enough to explain why ( †) should fail for f (in our example above). At the very least, this note serves as an invitation to Joyce to provide such an (independent) philosophical explication of his E.
